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Abstract
Do firms in China share rents with their workers? We address this question by ex-
amining firm-level panel data covering virtually all manufacturing firms over the period
2000-2007, representing an average of 200,000 firms and 54 million workers per year. We
find robust evidence of rent sharing (RS): workers that would move from low- to high-profit
firms would see their wages increase by about 45%. The results are based on multiple in-
strumental variables, including firm-specific international trade shocks. We also present
a number of complementary findings: RS is weaker in firms with more women and less
educated workers; RS involves an element of risk sharing, as wages also decrease when
profits fall; RS is lower in regions with more latent competition from rural workers; higher
minimum wages tend to reduce RS; and, while employer labour market power reduces
wages, it increases RS. Overall, despite its importance, RS in China is smaller than in
developed economies, which reflects the weaker bargaining power of its workers and the
different scope of its labour market institutions.
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1 Introduction
China’s emergence in the world economy starting in the 1990s was underpinned by a massive
process of labour reallocation delivered by the country’s nascent labour market. This paper
investigates the functioning of China’s labour market focusing on the nature of its wage deter-
mination process. In particular, we study the relevance of rent sharing: Is wage determination
in China essentially competitive, in the sense that workers of a given skill are paid their mar-
ket rate, regardless of the financial situation of their firm? Or is it that workers employed at
more profitable firms tend to be paid significantly higher wage rates than similar workers at
less profitable firms? Our study is one of the first to examine this critical aspect of the labour
market of China and the first to do so using comprehensive data.
Our analysis of China’s labour market is important given the far-reaching consequences
of China’s emergence in the world economy, including in the labour markets of developed
economies (Autor et al., 2013; Cabral et al., 2018). Our analysis of rent sharing in China is
also of particular interest given the country’s particular institutional structure. Despite its
impressive economic growth over the last decades, many formal labour market institutions
that are common in OECD countries are at a much earlier stage of development in China
(Song, 2017). These institutions include collective bargaining, independent trade unions,
and employment protection law, as well as unemployment benefits and other forms of social
protection. For instance, trade unions are indirectly controlled by the government and China’s
Communist Party, through their affiliation with the single national organisation (ACFTU),
and also generally led by firm managers, not blue-collar workers. Unwritten labour contracts
- which can increase the flexibility in the adjustment of working conditions by employers - are
also common, reflecting the generally limited scope of employment protection law.
These institutional aspects are relevant in our analysis as all of these labour market in-
stitutions can strengthen the bargaining power of workers and explain at least part of the
significant levels of rent sharing that have been documented in many OECD countries over
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the years, under different methodologies and data sets (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanch-
flower et al., 1996; Black and Strahan, 2003; Bronars and Famulari, 2001; Arai, 2003; Martins,
2009; Card et al., 2014; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2018). The much more limited number of
studies that consider the cases of developing or emerging countries include Teal 1996, Bigsten
et al. 2003, Knight and Li 2005 and Martins and Esteves 2006. Knight and Li 2005 consider
the case of China, using two individual-level cross-section surveys conducted in 1995 and 1999,
and find that workers that indicate that their firms had higher levels of profits are paid higher
wages.
Our analysis draws on comprehensive panel data covering virtually all manufacturing firms
in the country over the critical period of growth of 2000-2007, including World Trade Organ-
isation membership and subsequent growth in international trade. This data set corresponds
to an average of 200,000 firms and 54 million workers per year. Earlier studies in the rent
sharing literature that also consider firm-level data include Van Reenen 1996, Hildreth and
Oswald 2004 and Barth et al. 2016. While one cannot control for changes in the profiles of
the workforce of each firm over time with this type of data, our empirical analysis is based on
exogenous variation in profits driven by a number of instruments: the profits of other firms
of the same industry in other regions, the potentially sizable and variable subsidies awarded
by the government to firms, and interactions between lagged firm-level imports and exchange
rates. We also control for a number of time-varying variables and firm fixed effects as well
for year effects which are allowed to vary very flexibly, by province and two-digit industry
pair. Moreover, we consider the robustness of our findings to multiple alternative measures
of rents, such as profits before and after taxes or wages, and value added.
Our results indicate that rent sharing is an important attribute of the Chinese labour
market. However, our estimates may be at the lower bound of the international evidence. In
our main IV estimations, we find elasticities of about 3% and Lester ranges of around 45%.
When considering alternative measures of rents (profits before the wage bill), our elasticities
and Lester ranges nearly double to 6% and 86%, respectively. In both cases, these elasticities
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are significantly smaller than the average estimate of 15% for firm-level studies that is reported
by Card et al. 2018 in their review of the rent sharing literature, covering exclusively developed
countries.
We also find widespread evidence of rent sharing across the multiple sub-samples we con-
sider as well as a number of interesting exceptions. The subsamples where we do not find
evidence of rent sharing are state-owned and foreign firms, firms with a high share of female
workers, and firms with a high share of unskilled workers. These exceptions may be explained
by the different wage determination rules applied in the public sector, the relevance of transfer
pricing and international rent sharing between parents and affiliates of multinational firms,
and the differences in bargaining power of workers potentially subject to greater discrimination
or workers that can be more easily replaced.
In addition, we conduct a number of additional extensions that allow us to understand
better the sources and nature of the rent sharing results above. First, we find that rent sharing
is symmetric, in the sense that wages increase when profits increase but can also decrease
when profits decrease. This suggests a relevant risk sharing dimension in wage determination.
Second, we find that rent sharing is dampened by the presence of rural workers in neighbouring
regions, which highlights the role of bargaining and differences across firms in the degree to
which incumbent workers can be replaced. Third, minimum wages are found to reduce the
magnitude of rent sharing. Imposing wage increases to a large percentage of workers regardless
of the specific profitability of the firms makes wages less responsive to profits, in part because
such wage floors reduce the scope for risk sharing. Finally, we obtain evidence that labour
market concentration (Manning, 2011), measured here by the share of each firm’s employment
in total manufacturing employment in its local labour market or by employment concentration
in the local labour market (Herfindhal index), has a negative relationship with wages (Azar
et al., 2017) but a generally positive relationship with rent sharing. These results suggest that
employer local labour market power may allow firms to shift more risk to workers, increasing
the variable component of their total pay.
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In conclusion, despite the still emerging nature of many formal labour market institutions,
workers’ bargaining power appears to play an important role in shaping China’s wage distri-
bution, even if at a lower level than countries that are more developed, both economically and
institutionally. Moreover, rent sharing is found to be shaped by both workers’ and employers’
(local labour market) bargaining power. While workers are able to extract product market
surplus from their firms, firms with greater labour market power are also able to pay lower
and more variable wages.
The remaining of the paper is as follows: the next section describes the data used, after
which Section 3 presents the main results. Sections 4 and 5 study the heterogeneity of our
findings across different subsamples and present a number of extensions, respectively. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our main data source is the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database (CIED). CIED is an
annual survey of industrial firms conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
(NBSC), including all state-owned industrial enterprises, and non-state-owned enterprises
with annual sales of at least five million Chinese yuan (approximately USD 650,000) and
employing at least eight workers. These data have already been used in a number of studies,
including Hsieh and Klenow 2009 and Bai et al. 2018.
CIED covers 39 two-digit industries, spreading across all 31 mainland China provinces and
municipalities. In our analysis, we consider the period of 2000-2007 and all 30 manufacturing
sector industries (Upward et al., 2013). Manufacturing firms take up 90% of all enterprises
in CIED (Nie et al., 2012). According to Brandt et al. 2012, manufacturing firms in CIED in
2004 accounted for over 90% of total sales and 70% of employment of all manufacturing firms
in China in that year.1
1These statistics are consistent with our own calculations using population data on all manufacturing firms
of a Western country, Portugal (QP 2004 data set). In this case, imposing the same sales and number of
workers restrictions of CIED would lead to a sample of 81.3% of total manufacturing sales and 75.7% of all
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The CIED data set contains two sets of information of each surveyed enterprise. One is the
basic information of the enterprises, including firm’s identification, name, ownership, opening
year, address, number of workers, etc. The second set is the financial data from firms’ balance
sheets, income and cash flows statements, including gross profits, total wages, fixed assets,
gross industrial output, value of inventories, etc. We use this information to follow firms over
time, adopting the algorithm and program files of Brandt et al., 2012.
Total wages, which is our main dependent variable, refer to the total remuneration pay-
ments (total wage bill) for employees in each firm’s possibly multiple establishments during
the reporting period (the twelve months of each calendar year). Total wages consist of six
parts (hourly wages, piece wages, bonuses, allowances and subsidies, overtime wages, and
wages paid in particular cases), all collected into a single variable. We also consider addi-
tional information recorded in CIED in the year of 2004 alone, when China’s economic census
took place. For example, 2004 data reports the number of workers in each firm by gender,
education background and job titles, as well as information about trade union status of firms,
all of which we explore below.2
Our secondary data source is the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), which pro-
vides detailed monthly information on the universe of Chinese import and export transactions,
conducted by the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC). CCTS records main
firm information (firm’s name, address, postcode, telephone) and USD values of a firm’s im-
port (export) at the eight-digit product level from each source (to each destination) country.
(For a detailed description of this data and earlier applications, see Manova and Zhang 2012
manufacturing employment.
2A detailed description of total wages can be found at www.stats.gov.cn/english/. Note that, although
CIED provides rich firm-level information, some variables may be subject to noise, in large part as a result of
potential mis-reporting by some firms. Following Cai and Liu 2009 and Feenstra et al., 2014, and guided by
the ’General Accepted Accounting Principles’ document, we clean the data set and drop firm-year observations
according to the following restrictions that we impose: (1) key variables (such as wages, sales, value added,
gross output, income tax, net value of fixed assets and inventory) must be greater or equal to zero (and non-
missing), while total profits cannot be missing either; (2) the number of workers employed by a firm must not
be less than 8 (the minimum imposed by CIED); (3) a firm’s identification number cannot be missing and the
year must refer to the period 2000-2007; (4) total gross assets must be higher or equal to the liquid assets, the
total fixed assets and the net value of the fixed assets; (5) the ratio of value added to sales must be between
zero and one; (6) paid-in capital must be greater than zero and its components cannot be less than zero; and
(7) total liabilities, total current liabilities, long-term liabilities and welfare cannot be less than zero.
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and Manova and Yu 2017, for instance.) While each firm in the CIED and CCTS data has a
unique and time-invariant number, these are not the same in the two data sets. We thus use
the firms’ names, which are available in the two data sets, as the main matching variable to
merge these data sets (Tian and Yu, 2013). For a small group of firms with missing names, we
further adopt the combination of firms’ postcode or address and the last 7 digits of telephone
number to identify and link firms in both data sets. We also aggregate the imports (and
exports) of each firm by year.
Our final sample is an unbalanced panel that increases from 125,798 firms in 2000 to
299,203 firms in 2007. Tables B1 and B2 report additional information about the data and
its size. There are on average over 200,000 firms and nearly 54 million workers per year. This
figure compares with total employment (including farming activities) of about 740 million
workers per year. There are more then 450,000 different firms in total (for instance, 113,764
firms are present in one year only), of which nearly 40,000 firms are present in all eight years
covered.3
Nominal variables are converted to 2007 real values. We use the CPI as the price deflator of
wages and labour costs, the GDP deflator for gross profits, net profits, value added, exports,
imports and subsidies, and the Price Index of Investment in Fixed Assets for the average
balance of net fixed assets. All these price indices are collected from the National Bureau
of Statistics of China (NBSC). For gross output, we adopt the output deflator from Brandt
et al. 2012. Based on the information on firms’ ownership registered type and firms’ registered
capital, we group firms into four categories: state-owned firms, collective-owned firms, private
firms and foreign-owned firms, the latter group including firms from Hong Kong, Macao, and
Taiwan (HMT). We also consider the regional distribution of firms in terms of three main
3Total employment in the sector increased by over 58%, which is mostly driven by the growth of the number
of firms (over 100%) as continuing firms increase their employment by 8.5%. Part of the increase in the number
of firms and workers over the period is driven by the increased coverage of the data set from 2004, following
the census conducted in that year. Tables B1 and B2 also describe the subsets of importing firms, defined here
as firms that import a non-zero share of their output in a given year. We find that almost one third of the
workers in the data are employed by export or import firms although the numbers of export firms and import
firms only account for 10% of all firms each year.
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geographical areas.4
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents our key summary statistics, based on our full sample of 1.6 million firm-year
observations over the period 2000-2007. The mean of our key variable, average annual wages
per worker per firm-year, is 14.7 thousand yuan. When including welfare payments (health,
childcare and unemployment allowances provided by the firm), average labour costs increase
to 16.7. ’Gross profits per worker (after the wage bill)’ correspond to total profits, after
subtracting wage payments but including (not subtracting) profit tax payments, divided by
the number of workers. This is the main explanatory variable used in our empirical analysis.
It is measured in millions of 2007 yuan and its average in our sample is of 18.5 thousand
yuan.5
In our sample, firms employ an average of 254 workers, although the dispersion of this
variable is particularly high (standard deviation of 928). Firms’ age is on average 10.4 years.
Average capital per worker is 82.5 thousand yuan while average gross output per worker is
391.4 thousand yuan. Nearly 13% of the firms receive public subsidies, which correspond to
an average of one thousand yuan per worker (across all firms). As to our international trade
variables, average exports (imports) per worker are 31 (20) thousand yuan.
We find that more than half of all firms in the data are private. Only 8% are State-owned,
4Specifically, the registered type codes of state-owned firms include 110, 141, 143 and 151; the registered
type codes of collective-owned firms are 120, 130, 142 and 149; private firms refer to firms’ registered type
codes are 171, 172, 173, 174 and 190; for foreign-owned firms, the registered type codes are 210, 220, 230, 240,
310 320, 330 and 340. For the firms whose registered type code is 159 or 160, we categorized them according to
the largest ownership share in registered capital. The provinces in each area are the following: 1) Eastern area
- Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan;
2) Central area - Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Huna); and 3) Western area -
Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Tibet,
and Yunnan.
5All variables are deflated to 2007 yuan. Using 2018 exchange rates, the average annual salary corresponds to
USD 2,138. As to inequality, in 2004, the ratio of (employment-weighted) wage percentiles was 4.06 (percentile
90 divided by percentile 10), 2.13 (p90/p50) and 1.89 (p50/p10). The average of ’Gross profits per worker
(before the wage bill)’, which may reflect a better measure of potential rents to share with workers (Martins,
2009), is naturally higher, at 34 thousand yuan. ’Net profits per worker’ is equal to the ’Gross profits per worker
(after...)’ except that the firms’ profit taxes are subtracted. In this case, the average is of 15.6 thousand yuan.
Average value added per worker is much higher, at 109.1 thousand yuan. All variables have similar descriptive
statistics when weighting by firm size (see the bottom of Table 1), although means tend to be slightly higher,
as expected.
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while 14.3% are collectively owned6 and 21.6% are foreign owned. Most firms are located in
the Eastern Area, while only 16% and 9.6% are in the Central and Western Areas, respectively.
As indicated above, we also observe an increasing number of firms over time: for instance,
as many as 18.7% of firm-year observations refer to 2007 while less than 10% are observed in
each year of the period 2000-2002.7
Before presenting our econometric results, we also examine the data visually. Figure 1
presents the mean wages and profits of all firms in each industry, considering the intermediate
year of 2004 alone (Table B7 lists the industry codes used). We find evidence of a very
strong positive correlation between these two variables, which is suggestive of the presence of
rent sharing in the Chinese labour market. Figure 2 takes this analysis one step forward, by
plotting instead the real growth rates of both variables over the period 2000-2007. Again we
find evidence of a positive correlation between wages and profits, with the possible exceptions
of the four industries with profit growth rates of over 600%. It is also noteworthy that the real
growth rates of wages over this eight-year period are always above 50% and in many cases
above 100%. In the particular case of profits, most industries present growth rates above
200%.
3 Main results
Following the suggestive prima facie evidence of rent sharing above, we now examine the rela-
tionship between wages and profits econometrically. We consider the context of a bargaining
model between employers and workers (Blanchflower et al., 1996) and estimate different ver-
6Collectively-owned firms are industrial enterprises where the means of production are owned collectively,
including urban and rural enterprises invested by collectives and some enterprises which were formerly owned
privately but have been registered in industrial and commercial administration agency as collective units
through raising funds from the public.
7This is described in greater detail in Table B1, where we present the number of firms in each year (125,798
in 2000 and 299,203 in 2007, for instance) as well as the number of workers over the same period (42 million
in 2000 and 66 million in 2007) and the average firm sizes (which decline from 331 workers in 2000 to 221 in
2007). In an appendix, Table B1 also presents the number of importing firms and their workforce size in each
year, which exhibit even higher growth over the period. Furthermore, Table B2 presents the distribution of the
number of years in the data of each firm, where we find that as many as 39,294 firms are present in all eight
years.
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sions of the following equation:
Wageit = β1Profitit + β2Xit + αi + γjt + εit, (1)
where Wageit is the logarithm of the average wage per worker of firm i in year t, Profitit
is a measure of profits per worker of firm i in year t (including or not profit taxes and wages,
or value added), αi is a firm fixed effect, and γjt is a set of year effects, potentially varying
for each pair of (31) provinces and (30) industries. The key parameter is β1, which indicates
the semi-elasticity of wages with respect to profits.
The equation also includes a vector of control variables (Xit), which reflect a set of firm
characteristics that may have a direct impact on wages: the logarithm of number of workers,
the logarithm of capital per worker (capital intensity) - computed from the net value of fixed
assets (Yi and Linhui, 2015) -, the age of the firm, and a foreign-ownership dummy variable.
These variables may capture differences across firms and over time in worker characteristics,
and may also be correlated with profits, so that their inclusion leads to more conservative
estimates of rent sharing.
Table 2 reports our first set of estimates, always based on gross profits after the wage
bill, i.e. total profits (per worker) from which wages have been subtracted but profit taxes
have not. This type of profits can be argued to deliver somewhat lower estimates of rent
sharing when compared to its ’before the wage bill’ equivalent (Martins, 2009). The first
specification considers only year fixed effects, while the second adds the control variables
mentioned above (number of workers, capital, firm age, and a foreign-ownership indicator).
The third specification also considers firm fixed effects, while the fourth uses (7,440) ’crossed’
fixed effects, defined as a fixed effects for each combination of a year (8 cases), a two-digit
industry (30) and a province (31), instead of a simple set of year fixed effects common across
the country. These firm plus ’crossed’ fixed effects models pick up all time-invariant (observed
or unobserved) differences across firms plus all business cycle effects or systematic shocks
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that vary over time for each industry-province pair. Finally, specification 5 adopts the same
specification as 4 except that observations are weighted using the number of workers in each
firm-year. The number of observations is 1.6 million without firm fixed effects and 1.49 million
with firm fixed effects (the latter case drops observations of firms that appear only once in
the data).
We find in all specifications significant and positive effects of profits upon wages. The
profits coefficients range between .226 (specification 4) and .772 (specification 1). In our most
detailed specification and including employment weights, we find a coefficient of .456. Using
these figures, we also compute the wage-profit elasticities (by multiplying the rent sharing
coefficient by mean profits) and Lester ranges (the product of the elasticity by four times
the standard deviation of profits, divided by the mean profits (Lester, 1952)). The latter
statistic indicates that, in our preferred specification (5), workers that would hypothetically
move from low-profit to high-profit firms (two standard deviations below and above mean
profits, correspondingly) would see their wages increase by 13%. Even when not weighting
the data we find significant Lester ranges of 8%.
It is also interesting to note the coefficients of some of the remaining variables: We find
that firm size (number of workers) depresses average wages, particularly when accounting
for firm fixed effects, while capital per worker has the opposite effect. The former result is
mostly likely a composition effect, as new hires will necessarily have less experience in the firm
and may be less qualified as well and thus earn lower wages than incumbent colleagues, thus
driving their firms’ mean wages down. Again, it is important to note that, given the large pool
of available rural labour (estimated over this period at between 100 to 150 million workers
(Cai, 2008)), most firms are facing virtually flat labour supply curves. Foreign firms pay also
significantly higher wages, although this premium is reduced to 5% or less when controlling
for firm fixed effects, i.e. when focusing on foreign acquisitions or divestments (Hijzen et al.,
2013).
It is well known that the variation in profits across firms or within firms over time may not
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be exogenous. For instance, firms with more skilled workers may tend to have higher profits,
thus generating a positive bias in rent sharing estimates. Similarly, firms that happen to
have a positive shock on their profits may also then hire more skilled and expensive workers,
again leading to a positive rent sharing bias. Efficiency wages, in which firms obtain higher
productivity from offering higher wages, may also generate spurious rent sharing estimates.
We address this concern by considering different instrumental variables. The first one is the
average profits per worker of firms in the same four-digit industry and in the same year but
in other cities (of the same province and of other provinces). The average is weighted by each
firm’s employment. The rationale for this instrument is that other firms in the same industry
and year are likely to have similar profits, as they will be subject to similar product-market
demand-side shocks. However, those external profits are not likely to influence directly the
wages of an individual firm, other than through the effects of firm’s own profits. An exception
may arise when labour supply to the sector is inelastic, in which case the labour demand shock
may generate an equilibrium wage response (Card et al., 2018). However, this is not likely to
be very relevant in the case of China, especially over the period covered, given the large pool
of rural labour keen to take jobs in the manufacturing sector and the external shock related
to WTO membership in December 2001.
The second instrument we consider is the value of public subsidies that each firm receives
in each year, which amount on average to one thousand yuan per worker per firm-year,
as indicated in Table 1). These subsidies are awarded on a largely discretionary basis by
the government, although they appear to favour larger and capital-intensive firms, but not
necessarily specific sectors or specific types of firm ownership. Given their significant size,
these subsidies will contribute positively towards the profitability of the firm while again
should have no direct effect on wages other than through rent sharing. Finally, our third
instrument is based on international trade shocks. It is defined as the product of the total
imports of the firm in the previous year by the exchange rate (US dollars per yuan) in
the current year. The rationale is that the higher the value of imports of the firm, the
12
stronger the positive (negative) impact of a domestic currency appreciation (depreciation) on
the firm’s profits. Again, while this international trade/exchange rate shock should influence
profitability, it should have no direct effect upon wages other than through rent sharing.8
Table 3 - bottom panel - presents our first-stage results, first considering each instru-
ment in isolation and finally the three instruments together. We find that all instruments
are significant and have the expected positive signs, both when considered alone and when
considered jointly. The F-statistics are always extremely high, at 150 or above, and other
tests of instrument validity are also passed. When considering the instrumented rent sharing
estimates - upper panel -, focusing on our models with all control variables and fixed effects,
we find that the rent sharing coefficients increase considerably and remain highly significant,
as well as the resulting elasticities and Lester ranges. (The number of observations is smaller
in the specifications with the imports instrument as the lag structure implies that we lose
at least one observation of each firm.) Lester ranges are of at least 40%, increasing to 89%
when considering the international trade instrument and to 45% when considering the three
instrumental variables together. Elasticities are of at least 2% and nearly 3% when using the
three instruments in the first stage.
We also replicate the analysis above using an alternative measure of profits, gross profits
before the wage bill, in Table 4. As predicted, we now find typically higher rent sharing
estimates, in which Lester ranges (elasticities) are of at least 60% (4%) and as large as 86%
(6%) when considering our three instruments at the same time. When considering a broader
measure of wages, including welfare costs supported by the firm, we find even higher measures
of rent sharing - Table 5.
8See also Park et al. 2010, which uses a similar IV approach in the case of China, but based on exports,
and Macis and Schivardi 2016 that find that exporting firms pay wage premiums, in the context of a currency
devaluation episode in Italy. In our case, we did not find significant effects from interactions between exports
and exchange rates, in contrast to the case of imports. This result may be driven in part by the limited
variation of the exchange rate of the yuan in the first years of our sample period given the exchange rate policy
of the Chinese government at that time.
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4 Heterogeneity
Having established our main results, of significant levels of rent sharing in the Chinese labour
market, we now test their robustness and potential drivers by considering different groups of
firms, defined as a function of their characteristics and the characteristics of their workers.
Our first analysis, presented in Table 6, compares unionised and non-unionised firms. As in
all other results in this section, we draw on IV models (with all three instruments) and the
more conservative ’gross profits after wages’ measure of rents. We draw on the information
about the presence or not of a trade union in the firm in 2004 (the only year in which it
is available) to classify firms as unionised or non-unionised, assuming that such 2004 status
is unchanged in all other earlier and later years. (As we still drop observations from firms
that are not in our data in 2004, we examine a smaller data set, but still with over 440,000
firm-year observations.) We find that unionised firms exhibit slightly higher levels of rent
sharing, with a bigger point estimate (1.355 vs 1.247) and Lester range (48% vs 42%) but
virtually equal elasticities.
We interpret this small difference between the two firm types not only as a consequence
of our potentially noisy measure of unionisation but also as a reflection of the relatively weak
bargaining power of unions in China and their proximity to the interests of employers and
government. Indeed, all unions are affiliated with the ACFTU (All China Federation of Trade
Unions), which is controlled by the government. Previous evidence on this issue provides
contrasting views. For instance, Yao and Zhong 2013, who examine a cross section of over
1,200 firms in China in 2006, finds that unionization is significantly associated with higher
hourly wages (as well as lower hours and a higher likelihood of pension coverage). On the
other hand, Budd et al. 2014 finds that union density does not affect average wage levels in
China while Anwar and Sun 2015 finds positive effects but only in some industries. It is also
important to take into account that recent causal studies from developed countries challenge
previous observational evidence indicating positive union effects, at least on productivity (Lee
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and Mas, 2012; Liu, 2010). At the firm level, unions are often headed by management staff,
not by (blue-collar) workers.
Our second robustness check compares labour- and capital-intensive industries. We ex-
pected that workers bargaining power will be stronger in capital-intensive industries, where
labour costs will tend to represent a lower share of total costs while labour-related disruption
can be more costly to employers. We find that this is indeed the case, but only for non-public-
owned firms (domestic private- and foreign-owned firms) - Table 7. However, in public-owned
firms, rent sharing is actually higher in labour-intensive firms than capital-intensive firms.
When pooling the two types of firms, we find that the contribution from public-owned firms
dominates and rent sharing is actually stronger in labour intensive firms (results available
upon request).
Table 8 compares rent sharing across four types of firm ownership (State-, collective-,
private- and foreign-owned firms). Here we find significant effects only in the cases of private-
and collective-owned firms. As already indicated in our descriptive statistics, the former are
the largest group, accounting for over half a million firm-years. These results indicate that,
on average, State-owned firms do not engage in rent sharing, as we had already noted in the
case of capital-intensive sectors. This lack of rent sharing is perhaps because of greater human
resource management reliance on fixed pay schemes or product pricing policies that lead to
low levels of rents that could then be shared with workers. On the other hand, the lack of
rent sharing in the case of foreign firms may appear more surprising, at least because their
HRM practices could be expected to involve significant levels of variable pay. These findings
may be explained by rent sharing that is a function largely of the profits of the multinational
parents and not necessarily or mostly of the profits of the affiliate in China (Martins and
Yang, 2015). Particularly in a context of transfer pricing, the host economy profitability of
the multinational firms may be only loosely related to the actual profitability of the affiliate.
We now turn to our analysis of different samples based on worker characteristics. In Table
9 we compare firms with above or below median percentages of female workers (using again
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the information from 2004 data to classify firms in the remaining years). This median is
of 27.8%, reflecting the greater share of male workers in the manufacturing sector. We find
striking differences between the two groups: while rent sharing for firms with high shares
of male workers is large, with an elasticity of 3.9% and a Lester range of 55%, we do not
find evidence of significant rent sharing in the case of firms with above-median shares of
female workers. These results are consistent with evidence for other (developed) countries
(Black and Strahan, 2003, Nekby, 2003, Martins, 2009). These may reflect multiple factors,
including gender discrimination, childcare, skills, mobility costs, or willingness to bargain over
pay.
Table 10 considers differences in workers’ skill. We expect that rent sharing will be stronger
across firms with more skilled workers, which tend to be less easily replaceable and thus will
have stronger bargaining power. Indeed, we find that statistically significant rent sharing can
only be found for firms with above-median skilled workforces. This median corresponds to
firms in which the percentage of skilled workers, with any form of technical title, is above
4.1%, a low figure that reflects the low-skill-labour intensive nature of most manufacturing in
China. In above-median firms, the wage-profit elasticity is of 3.4% and the Lester range is
51%. In firms with below-median skilled workforces, the profits coefficient is still large but
imprecise enough not to be significant even at the 10% level, although with an elasticity of
2% and a Lester range of 34%, considerably smaller than the case of above-median skill firms.
In our final robustness checks, we redo our main analysis, based on the full sample and
again using IV methods, but considering different net profits (i.e. subtracting taxes) and value
added measures. The results are presented in Tables A1 and A2 (net profits, using OLS and
IV), Table A3 (gross profits before the wage bill, using OLS) and Tables A4 and A5 (value
added, using OLS and IV). We find in all cases estimates of rent sharing similar or above those
of our main results. In an appendix, we also present additional evidence considering multiple
subsamples along other margins of differentiation. Tables B3, B4, B5, and B6 consider the
cases of firm size (samples split at the median of 104 workers), firm age (median of 7 years),
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regions and workers’ schooling (median of 9.5 years). Again in most subsamples we find
significant rent sharing and Lester ranges of 25% or above. The exceptions are the cases of
small firms and firms with less schooled workers, the latter result being consistent with the
findings presented above on workers’ skill.
5 Extensions
5.1 Asymmetric effects
In an additional analysis and contribution to the rent sharing literature, we consider the
role of rent sharing when firms experience different changes in their profits. While rent
sharing is typically perceived as a positive mechanism for workers, as it increases their wages
when profits increase, it can also be regarded as a negative contribution to their welfare if
rent sharing means that wages are cut at periods in which profits fall or become negative.
For instance, Juhn et al. 2018 finds evidence that firms in the U.S. insulate workers from
idiosyncratic shocks. Similarly, Guiso et al. 2005 find that firms in Italy provide insurance
to their workers against temporary but not permanent shocks. Ideally from the workers’
perspective, rent sharing would involve some degree of asymmetry, whereby wages increase
when profits increase but wages do not decrease when profits fall. The opposite case could
be regarded as that of ’risk sharing’ (Bigsten et al., 2003), in which firms share their risk
with their workforce. The desirability of such asymmetry from the workers’ perspective is
particularly strong taking into account the potential psychological cost from wage cuts, as
discussed in the downward wage rigidity literature. Collective bargaining typically delivers
such asymmetric arrangements, as wage floors are pushed up during boom periods but tend
to not decline during downturns, at least in nominal terms. In other words, this asymmetric
arrangement - wage increases when rents increase but wage stability when rents fall - could
be regarded as a stronger form of rent sharing (of greater benefit for workers), involving wage
insurance, even if the resulting rent sharing estimates are smaller than in the case of full
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symmetry.
We analyse this question by considering three groups of firm(-years): those which exhibit
declines in gross profits by 10% or more compared to the previous year; those whose gross
profits vary between -10% and +20% compared to the previous year; and those whose gross
profits increase by more than 20%.9 Under the case of full symmetric rent sharing, we would
expect similar coefficients in the three groups of firm-years. Under the case of asymmetric rent
sharing, rent sharing would be positive when firms experience increases in their profits but
zero when firms undergo decreases in profits. While theoretically possible, we do not expect
a third case in which there is rent sharing only when profits fall, implying wage decreases
during those times but no wage increases when profits increase.
Table 11 presents our results. We find evidence of similar rent sharing effects across the
three types of changes in profits, with coefficients of between 1 and 1.2 in the three cases, even
if these are far more precisely estimated in the case of increases in profits. The coefficient is
not significant in the case of stable profits, which will be driven by the limited variation in
the regressor that follows from sample construction. Elasticities vary somewhat, because of
the different profit means across subsamples. However, Lester ranges are again very similar,
ranging between 36% and 39% across subsamples. We therefore interpret these findings as
supportive of the case of symmetric rent sharing, which can be taken to be equivalent to risk
sharing. In other words, we find evidence that wages increase when profits increase but also
decrease when profits fall.
5.2 Rural labour
In our second extension, we consider the role of rural labour in rent sharing. The availability of
large numbers of workers in rural areas keen to take better-paying jobs in manufacturing can
be an important force shaping rent sharing. Under a bargaining perspective, the greater the
9To be able to better study the relationship between the changes in profits and the changes in wages, we
consider both the before and after years of each firm in each type of change above. For instance, a firm classified
in the group of increases in profits in year t because its profits in that year are at least 20% higher than in year
t− 1 will have both its t and t− 1 observations included in the sample that examines rent sharing in periods
of profits growth.
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number of these workers, the weaker the bargaining power of incumbent workers in factories,
as they can be more easily replaced, and the smaller the rent sharing that incumbent workers
would consequently enjoy.
To test the hypothesis above, we collect data on the rural employment in urban areas. We
were able to obtain these data from the China Labour Statistics Yearbook for the Jiangsu
province alone, during the same period of 2000-2007. We then match this information about
rural employment with our main data set, considering six-digit county codes, so that we
can relate wage determination in the manufacturing sector, including rent sharing, with the
relevance of rural employment in each same region. As Jiangsu is the second largest province
in the country in terms of employment and firms, we still obtain a large sample, with over
140,000 firm-years.
Our estimations are based on similar specifications as in our benchmark analyses, except
that we add two additional regressors: the level of rural employment and an interaction
between that variable and the gross profits of each firm. In both specifications considered,
based on year or crossed fixed effects (the latter defined here as year dummies that can vary
across two-digit industries), we find - Table 12 - that the interaction variable above is negative
and significant. In other words, as expected in our discussion above, rent sharing is found to
be dampened by the nearby presence of large numbers of rural workers. We interpret these
results as additional evidence that at least part of the mechanism driving our estimates of
rent sharing is the relative bargaining power of employers and workers.
5.3 Minimum wages
Can minimum wages represent a form of mandated rent sharing and to that extent explain
at least part of our evidence in Section 3? Minimum wages were first introduced in seven
provinces in China in 1994, covering not more than 130 cities by the end of 1995 (Huang et al.,
2014). Their setting sought to take into account the specific conditions faced in each labour
market. Given their decentralised nature, if the setting of minimum wages is influenced by the
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profitability of firms in each region, then they could indeed shape rent sharing. Differentiated
minimum wages could even play some of the role of collective bargaining extensions, in which
non-unionised firms and workers are also required to comply with the terms of collective
agreements, including their minimum wages (Martins, 2014), in this case in a context in
which collective bargaining is still in its early stages of development.
To investigate this potential alternative explanation for our benchmark findings, we col-
lected the monthly minimum wages for 2,855 counties across the country between 2004 and
2007, accounting for 96.4% of the total number of counties in China. This data collection was
achieved by browsing various government web sites, policy documents, statistical bulletins and
official newspapers. When collecting the data, we also took into account that, according to
the minimum wage regulations issued by China’s Department of Labour and Social Security,
the minimum wage standard generally adopts the forms both of a monthly minimum wage
and an hourly minimum wage. Moreover, as we also collected the specific dates (month and
year) of the implementation of the changes in minimum wages, which may occur at different
times in the year and or more than once in a year, we compute the annual average minimum
wages by weighting each minimum wage by the number of months in which it was in force
during the year. This (weighted) average minimum wage is then matched to our main data
set using each firm’s six-digit county code and observation year.10
Some descriptive statistics of the resulting data set are presented in Table 13. We find that
the average annual real minimum wages (across counties and years) is of 5.1 thousand yuan,
while the average wages is of 14.3 thousand yuan. The resulting average firm-level Kaitz ratio
(defined as the ratio between the applicable minimum wage in the county where the firm is
located and the mean wage of the firm) is 51.6%, a relatively large number. However, when
10See also Gan et al., 2016 for a recent study of the impact of minimum wages in China. The wages of
firms were also subject to a ’wage guidance system’ determined by the labour department of each province,
depending on the situation of the local economy (Holz, 2014). Under these not necessarily binding guidelines,
firms were required in some cases to increase wages of their workers between lower and upper baselines (e.g. 5
and 20%), varying by province and year. Moreover, state-owned firms were subject to additional constraints
in their wage setting: for instance, total wages may have to increase by between .3% and .7% per each 1%
increase in the relevant performance measure (profits including taxes) of the firm. At the same time, average
wages in state-owned firms could not increase by more than the increase in labour productivity of the firm.
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weighting by firm size, this Kaitz ratio drops to only 37%. At the same time, annual real
minimum wages increased by over 30% between 2004 and 2007. This is again a large number,
which underlines the potential of minimum wages to explain at least part of our benchmark
results.
Table 14 presents our analysis, considering again the 2004-2007 period. All columns are
based on a version of our data aggregated at the county-year level, resulting in 10,896 obser-
vations. First, we examine the responsiveness of minimum wages to local profits, which we
regard as a necessary condition for minimum wages to be a source of rent sharing. In our
first specification, presented in column 1, we regress the log of the minimum wages in each
county and year on the (employment-weighted) average profits of the firms in the same county
and year, plus county and year fixed effects. Because of the aggregation of the data, here we
present estimates excluding instrumental variables, disregarding the potentially endogenous
nature of profits and most likely underestimating rent sharing. We find that local minimum
wages are significantly and positively associated with average gross profits per worker in each
county-year, even if its coefficient can be regarded as low (0.146). This result supports the
hypothesis that rent sharing could be driven at least in part by minimum wage setting. In
other words, minimum wages may be increasing more in counties where firms’ profits are also
increasing more, resulting in a form of mandated rent sharing.
However, when considering the log of the average wages per worker in each county-year
instead of the log of the minimum wages as our dependent variable, in column 2, we find
that the role of average profits is much stronger, by a factor of more than 10 (1.637 vs
0.146). Moreover, when we include the minimum wage of each county and year in the log
wage specification above, we find that the resulting county-level rent sharing estimates are not
affected (1.629), even if the minimum wages coefficient is still positive. In other words, while
minimum wages are associated with higher average wages, county-level firm profitability not
only still appears to have an independent positive effect on wages but also exhibits a much
stronger association with average wages.
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Finally, we also consider an additional specification, in which we add an interaction be-
tween average profits and minimum wages to our list of regressors. We find, in column 4, that
rent sharing is negatively affected by minimum wages as the coefficient of the interaction is
negative (-0.352). In other words, the higher the level of minimum wages in a given county,
the lower the extent to which wages increase following an increase in the profits of the firms
in the same county.11 This finding is consistent with our earlier evidence of symmetric rent
sharing: minimum wages act as a barrier against wage reductions or slower wage growth and
can therefore reduce the scope for wage adjustments during periods of declining profits.
5.4 Employer market power
In our last extension, we consider the role of monopsony power. While employer local labour
market power has received greater attention recently (Manning, 2011; Azar et al., 2017; Card
et al., 2018; Martins, 2018), including in terms of its wage implications, monopsony has not
been approached explicitly in the context of rent sharing before as far as we know. However,
we argue here that employer labour market power can not only affect wages but also the
extent to which rents are shared by firms with workers. More specifically, we put forward
and test the hypothesis that employer power may allow firms not only to lower total pay -
employer power may also let firms rebalance total pay components by lowering the size of
the fixed component while increasing the magnitude of the variable component, the latter
related to rent (and risk) sharing. In other words, for a given total level of pay, firms with
more employer market power may be able to increase the variable salary component to the
detriment of the fixed component.
Before moving to our econometric study of this question, we present a number of graphical
analysis that illustrate and compare the potential relevance of employer power across China’s
local labour markets.12 Figures 3 and 4 draw on 2004 data only, an intermediate year over
11We find similar effects when examining these relationships at the firm-level, interacting firm profits with
the minimum wage of the firm’s district or counties: rent sharing at the firm level is negatively affected by the
applicable minimum wage. These results are available upon request.
12In China, each province is composed of multiple cities. Each city is composed of multiple counties (xian,
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the period covered, for illustration purposes, and present the distributions of the shares of
each firm’s employment in the total employment of all firms in its local labour market and
of the shares of each firm’s sales in its four-digit industry, respectively. We find that in both
cases, these shares tend to be very low, almost always below 2.5%. This is despite of our focus
entirely on the manufacturing sector and the exclusion of private firms with sales below five
million yuan in the data.
We also examine our data from a different perspective, by considering separately the
cases of the 2,131 local labour markets and the 425 four-digit industries in 2004. Figures 5
and 6 present the Herfindhal–Hirschman Indices (HHI; the sum of the square of 100 times the
employment or sales share of each firm) across local labour markets or industries, respectively.
We find fairly similar distributions, somewhat more dispersed in the case of the labour market
(employment) than of the product market (sales). This is consistent with the mean HHIs that
we obtain: The mean labour market HHI is 2,038, when not weighting local labour markets
by total employment, a figure not very far from the 2,500 value considered to be a threshold at
which (product) market power may be significant; however, this measure drops significantly,
to 424, when weighting by total employment of each local labour market. We also find that
24.3% of the local labour markets, corresponding to 3.23% of China’s manufacturing sector
workforce (1.7 million out of 51.4 million), display HHIs greater than 2,500 (519 out of 2,131).
The corresponding average HHI figures in the case of the product market are much lower, at
493 and 188, in part because of the lower number of four-digit industries considered.13
Our econometric evidence follows the same models of our main findings of Section 3 but
typically more rural) or districts (qu, typically more urban) - see Baum-Snow et al., 2017 for a detailed
description. In our paper, all the districts in a city are regarded as one local labour market, whereas each
county is regarded as a different local labour market.
13Figure 7 displays a scatter plot of the local labour market employment shares of the leading firms in
each local labour market and their shares in total sales in their four-digit industries, with the size of the
circles proportional to the employment level of each firm. Most firms do not exhibit very large product-market
shares - indeed, only eight out of 2,131 local labour market leaders have product-market shares above 30%
and these have been excluded from the Figure to make it clearer. Moreover, the Figure suggests a lack of a
relationship between labour and product market relevance. At the same time, consistently with the differences
in concentration in product and labour markets presented before, the latter dimension appears particularly
relevant, even taken into account our sample construction criterion, as many firms have large shares of the
employment of their local labour markets.
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extended to account for the potential role of employer market power. We do this by including
in our benchmark wage equation a linear or a quadratic term of the share of the employment
of the firm in the total (manufacturing) employment in the local labour market where the
firm is located. Moreover, we also include interactions of this linear or quadratic term with
our measure of rents (gross profits after the wage bill, as before). While the employment
share will pick up the direct effect of employer market power on wages (Azar et al., 2017), the
interaction of the employment share with rents will shed light on the novel role of employer
market power on rent sharing that we propose here. We consider models with year effects or
crossed effects as well.
The results, presented in Table 15, indicate that employer market power has a negative
effect on wages. This result is consistent with the limited research available, which considers
so far almost exclusively the case of the U.S.. In our specifications allowing for non linear
relationships, we find some moderating (U-shaped) effect but this is only relevant at very
high employer market power levels and is not in any case large enough to reverse the overall
negative sign of the relationship. For its most relevant range, a 10 percentage point increase
in employer market power (measured as the percentage of the firm’s employment in the total
manufacturing employment in the local labour market) can be associated to a decline in wages
of at least 2.9% (linear specification) or 8.7% (quadratic model). When considering the role
of employer market power on rent sharing, we find, in contrast, a positive relationship, with
a coefficient of about 3. This implies that rent sharing coefficient would increase from 1.2
to about 1.5 (= 1.2 + 0.1 ∗ 3) in the case of firms with employment shares of 10%. In the
quadratic specification, this effect on rent sharing from employer labour market power is again
positive, even if mildly inverted-U-shaped, with a linear coefficient of 14.2 and a quadratic
term of -16. In other words, a 10% increase in the firm’s local labour market share, while
holding everything else constant, may double the overall rent sharing effect, from 1.2 to 2.4
(= 1.2+0.1∗14−0.12∗16). We also consider models in which we use the HHI indices (common
for all firms in a local labour market) instead of individual firm shares. Again we find that
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employer concentration has a negative effect on wages but a positive effect on rent sharing.
At a HHI of 1000 (or 0.1 in the measurement adopted in the regression), wages would be 2.7%
lower and rent sharing would increase by 0.45, from 1.55 to 2.
We interpret these novel results as supporting our hypothesis above that firms and workers
in contexts of employer labour market power, at least in the case of China, engage in a trade-
off between wage levels and rent sharing effects. Higher levels of such market power appear to
depress wages across the board but also make wages more responsive to firms’ rents. As we
have seen before, this trade-off may reflect a form of risk sharing from employers to workers,
in which the latter are less insulated from the fluctuations in the product market through this
interaction with the firm’s power in the local labour market.
6 Conclusions
Do firms in China share rents with their workers? This question that we addressed here is
important for multiple reasons. First, despite being the largest and arguably most dynamic
labour market in the world, China’s labour market is still relatively poorly studied, including
in its wage determination and income inequality dimensions. Moreover, the intensity of the
economic links between China and all other countries implies that a better understanding
the Chinese labour market can facilitate a better understanding of its potentially disruptive
effects on labour markets elsewhere (Autor et al., 2013; Cabral et al., 2018). Second, China’s
labour institutions are distinctive from those found in OECD economies, also in dimensions
that may influence wage determination and workers’ bargaining power (including minimum
wages, trade unions, collective bargaining and unemployment benefits). At the same time, the
large pools of available workers in rural areas represent another potential factor influencing
rent sharing.
Our empirical analysis is based on a rich firm-level panel data set covering virtually all
manufacturing firms over the critical period 2000-2007, when China joined the World Trade
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Organisation, including an average of about 200,000 firms and 54 million workers per year. Our
data also includes information about a large number of financial variables and international
trade, again at the firm level, and some workforce information, the later exclusively for the
year of 2004. We also complement these data with additional information on rural employment
and minimum wages that we collected from multiple sources. Furthermore, we exploit the
population coverage of our main data set to measure each firm’s significance in both its
product and labour markets and to study the potential impact of these two dimensions of
rent sharing. In this context, and with due attention to institutional aspects, we seek to
provide a perspective as comprehensive as possible of the magnitude, heterogeneity and some
of the drivers and explanations of rent sharing in China.
Our main result is that rent sharing is a significant component of wage determination in
China. Firms’ profitability affects the wage distribution over and above any differences driven
by competitive mechanisms. This result is consistent with the findings for many developed
countries with very different labour market institutions. In the case of China, using instru-
mental variable models and a large set of firm and year-industry-province fixed effects and
other control variables, we estimate wage-rent elasticities of at least 3% and Lester ranges of
at least 45%. Moreover, using alternative measures of rents, these figures can nearly double.
However, despite significant, these rent sharing estimates are at the lower bound of similar
studies for developed economies and significantly below the average of 15% documented in
Card et al. 2018. We also find that, while rent sharing is pervasive across all multiple sub-
samples we consider, it is lower in particular cases - firms with a higher share of women or
unskilled workers, non-unionised firms, and foreign firms - which allow us to understand in
greater detail the nature of rent sharing in the country.
Finally, we present a number of novel analyses that shed further light on the mechanics
behind rent sharing and its interpretation and may be compared in the future with other
countries, including both developed and emerging economies. First, rent sharing is found
to be largely symmetric, in the sense that wages increase when profits increase but can also
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decrease when profits decrease, which is also consistent with risk sharing between firms and
their workers. Second, rent sharing tends to be smaller in regions with higher numbers
of rural workers, reflecting greater potential competition for incumbent workers and more
limited bargaining power. Third, minimum wages reduce the degree of rent sharing in the
labour market, possibly by reducing the scope for firms to engage in risk sharing, given the
higher wage floors. Fourth, we find that, while employer local labour market power tends to
depress wages, it also increases rent sharing, which again can be regarded as another indication
of risk sharing.
In conclusion, despite the still emerging nature of many formal labour market institutions,
which can strengthen the bargaining power of labour, workers in China already see their wages
respond to the profitability of their firms. At the same time, while bargaining power plays
an important role in shaping the wage distribution in China, rent sharing is much lower than
in developed economies. Moreover, we find that bargaining power matters not only in the
product market but also in the (local) labour market.
A question that we leave for further research concerns the wider impact of the moderate
levels of rent sharing documented here. Given the large labour pools available in neighbouring
rural areas throughout the period examined, the significant but limited rent sharing docu-
mented in this paper (partly shaped by policy choices) may have played a significant role in
the employment growth of the China’s manufacturing sector as well as in the labour markets
of other countries.
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Figure 1: Wages and profits (per worker) by industry, in 2004
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database. Employment-weighted averages
of wages and (gross) profits of all firms in each industry. The variables are measured in thousands of yuan
per person. The names of each industry are indicated in Table B7. The sizes of the circles are proportional
to the employment of the industry. The 2004 wages and gross profits of industry 16 are 54.37 and 292.52,
respectively, and have been omitted from the Figure.
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Figure 2: Real growth rates of wages and profits (per worker) by industry, 2000-2007
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database. The name of each industry are
indicated in Table B7. The wage and profit growth rates of industry 25 are 69.6% and 2,026.7%, respectively,
and have been omitted from the Figure. The first year in the case of industry 43 is 2003.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, full sample (2000-2007)
Variables Mean StDev
Wages per worker 14.673 72.281
Labour Costs per worker 16.688 72.866
Gross Profits per worker (after the wage bill) 0.0185 0.0951
Gross Profits per worker (before the wage bill) 0.0340 0.1274
Total Profits per worker (before the labour costs) 0.0362 0.1281
Net Profits per worker 0.0156 0.0906
Value Added per worker 0.1091 0.2880
Firm size 253.72 927.55
Firm age 10.373 10.836
Capital per worker 82.492 205.55
Gross output per worker 391.38 905.52
Subsidy received 0.1292 0.3355
Subsidies per worker 0.0010 0.0315
Exports per worker 0.0308 0.3286
Imports per worker 0.0199 0.3364
State-owned firms 0.0803 0.2717
Collective-owned firms 0.1434 0.3505
Foreign-owned firms 0.2157 0.4113
Labour-intensive industry 0.5320 0.4990
Central Area 0.1603
Western Area 0.0959
Textiles (17) 0.0874
Non-metallic Mineral products (31) 0.0837
Comms, Computers and Other Elect. Equipment (40) 0.0334
Transport Equipment (37) 0.0473
General Purpose Machinery (35) 0.0779
Year 2001 0.0853
Year 2002 0.0913
Year 2003 0.1040
Year 2004 0.1424
Year 2005 0.1472
Year 2006 0.1648
Year 2007 0.1865
Weighted analysis (number of workers per firm)
Wages per worker 15.977 66.206
Labour Costs per worker 18.523 66.831
Gross Profits per worker (after the wage bill) 0.0187 0.0724
Gross Profits per worker (before the wage bill) 0.0357 0.1081
Total Profits per worker (before the labour cost) 0.0384 0.1093
Net Profits per worker 0.0154 0.0638
Value Added per worker 0.0994 0.2489
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database. The num-
ber of firm-year observations is 1,604,000. The monetary variables ’Wages per worker’,
’Labour Costs per worker’, ’Capital per worker’ and ’Gross Output per worker’ are in thou-
sands of Yuan (RMB). The monetary variables ’Gross Profits per worker (after the wage
bill)’, ’Gross Profits per worker(before the wage bill)’,’Total Profits per worker (before the
labour costs)’, ’Net Profits per worker’, ’Value Added per worker’ ’Exports per worker’,
’Imports per worker’ and ’Subsidies per worker’ are in millions of Yuan (RMB).’Labour
Costs per worker’ is the sum of wage-, welfare- and unemployment insurance per worker.
’Total Profits per worker (before the labour costs)’is the sum of ’Gross Profits per worker
(after the wage bill)’ and ’Labour Costs per worker’. ’Firm size’ is the number of employees
in each firm. ’Firm age’ is the difference between the calendar year and the birth year (plus
one).
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Table 2: Rent sharing, OLS models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross Profits 0.772 0.582 0.255 0.226 0.456
(0.160)∗∗∗ (0.122)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗
Firm size -0.009 -0.143 -0.148 -0.163
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Capital per worker 0.070 0.063 0.062 0.077
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Foreign 0.357 0.045 0.050 0.019
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Constant 2.448 2.163 2.912 2.932 3.298
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,604,000 1,604,000 1,490,236 1,489,980 1,489,980
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.212 0.601 0.612 0.715
F statistic 13,335,093 4,884,901 9,177,347 9,436,094 1,831,144
Elasticity 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.009
Lester Range (%) 29.37 22.12 9.60 8.45 13.23
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total
profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. The control variables ’Firm size’ and ’Capital per
worker’ are in logs. In column 5, we use the number of workers in each firm-year as weights, while the
remaining regressions are unweighted. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year,
a two-digit industry and a province. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance
levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table 3: Rent sharing, IV models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross Profits 1.076 1.551 2.630 1.346
(0.319)∗∗∗ (0.631)∗∗ (1.470)∗ (0.315)∗∗∗
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,489,967 1,489,980 1,010,419 1,010,411
Adjusted R2 0.604 0.593 0.598 0.631
F statistics 3,784 3,584 2,123 2,475
Elasticity 0.020 0.029 0.054 0.028
Lester Range (%) 40.43 58.26 88.78 45.45
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.185 0.189
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.00002
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.496 0.496 0.600 0.600
F statistics 261.1 232.2 188.1 150.2
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 211.9 17.82 6.695 181.1
(under-identification test)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.0097 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 162.7 11.91 2.977 44.32
(weak instruments test)
Hansen J statistic 2.046
(over-identification test)
Hansen J p-value 0.360
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits
(’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination
of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instrument in column 1 is the average total
profits (after the wage bill) per worker of firms in the same four-digit industry and in the same year
but in other cities (of the same province and of other provinces). The instrument in column 2 is
firm’s annual subsidies provided by the Government. The instrument in column 3 is the interaction
between the total imports of the firm in the previous year and the exchange rate (US dollars
per yuan) in the current year. In column 4, all instruments from columns 1, 2 and 3 are used
together. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**);
and 0.01(***). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value in column 3 is 0.096.
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Table 4: Rent sharing, IV models, Profits before the wage bill
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gross Profits 1.194 1.542 2.230 1.636
(0.487)∗∗ (0.604)∗∗ (1.092)∗∗ (0.547)∗∗∗
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,489,967 1,489,980 1,010,419 1,010,411
Adjusted R2 0.598 0.579 0.514 0.582
F statistics 3,938 3,811 2,426 2,577
Elasticity 0.041 0.053 0.083 0.061
Lester Range (%) 60.3 77.86 117.3 86.08
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.121 0.103
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.048)∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.00002
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.249 0.200 0.200
F statistics 419.3 405.9 316.1 233.9
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 14.97 11.22 3.435 5.393
Hansen J p-value 0.752
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits
(’before the wage bill’) per worker per firm. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination
of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instrument in column 1 is ’average total profits
(’before the wage bill’) per worker of firms in the same four-digit industry and in the same year but
in other cities (of the same province and of other provinces). The instrument in column 2 is firm’s
annual subsidies. The instrument in column 3 is the interaction between the total imports of the firm
in the previous year and the exchange rate (US dollars per yuan) in the current year. In column 4, all
instruments used in column 1, 2 and 3 are used together. Values in parentheses are robust standard
errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01(***). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value
in column 3 is 0.096.
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Table 5: Rent sharing, IV models, Profits before the labour costs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Profits 1.061 2.061 2.351 1.733
(0.461)∗∗ (0.685)∗∗∗ (1.063)∗∗ (0.555)∗∗∗
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,489,967 1,489,980 1,010,419 1,010,411
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.543 0.507 0.580
F statistics 4,114 3,722 2,500 2,673
Elasticity 0.039 0.075 0.092 0.068
Lester Range (%) 53.91 104.7 124.5 91.76
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.1207 0.1020
(0.030)∗∗∗ (0.046)∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Total import(1st lag) 0.0000 0.0000
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.252 0.205 0.205
F statistics 445.4 434 333.9 245.6
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 15.92 11.35 3.551 5.542
Hansen J p-value .7393
Notes: Dependent variable: log average labour costs per worker per firm. ’Total labour costs
per worker’ is the wage bill per worker plus welfare expenses (including unemployment insurance)
paid by the firm per worker per form. ’Total profits’ is the total profits (’after the wage bill’)
per worker(as same as that in Table 3) plus the ’Total labour costs’ per worker per firm. Crossed
Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The
instrument in column 1 is ’average total profits (’before the wage bill’) per worker of firms in the
same four-digit industry and in the same year but in other cities (of the same province and of other
provinces). The instrument in column 2 is firm’s annual subsidies. The instrument in column 3 is
the interaction between the total imports of the firm in the previous year and the exchange rate
(US dollars per yuan) in the current year. In column 4, all instruments used in column 1, 2 and
3 are used together. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*);
0.05 (**); and 0.01(***). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value in column 3 is 0.096.
40
Table 6: Rent sharing by firm unionisation type
Unionized Firms Non-Unionized Firms
Gross Profits 1.355 1.246
(0.354)∗∗∗ (0.583)∗∗
Observations 440,675 402,158
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.577
F statistics 1,110 971.4
Elasticity 0.028 0.028
Lester Range (%) 47.94 41.91
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.236 0.137
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.00007 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.00002
×
Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000)∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.595 0.620
F statistics 62.55 96.1
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 29.01 11.94
Hansen J p-value 0.836 0.301
Notes: The sample is split considering the 2004 variable on whether a union was established in
the firm at the time. Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’
is the total profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm
and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a
year, a two-digit industry and a province. Instruments are the same as those in Table 3. Values
in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table 7: Rent sharing by capital intensity
Non-public Firms Public Firms
Labour-intensive Capital-intensive Labour-intensive Capital-intensive
Gross Profits 0.586 0.842 8.203 1.341
(1.529) (0.362)∗∗ (2.931)∗∗∗ (0.995)
Observations 348,827 385,156 97,749 90,510
Adjusted R2 0.595 0.642 0.645 0.692
F statistics 583.5 784 260 287.1
Elasticity 0.007 0.027 0.073 0.024
Lester Range (%) 11.73 39.38 89.82 37.01
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Averaged profits per worker 0.045 0.280 0.017 0.170
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗ (0.016) (0.060)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000)∗ (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.705 0.591 0.650 0.660
F statistics 67.25 41.69 30.5 15.9
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 7.224 22.19 2.917 4.315
Hansen J p-value 0.790 0.205 0.283 0.187
Notes: The median capital-labour ratio across all industries, which is used to split the 2-digit industries into two groups, is 39.04
thousands of Yuan per worker. The median capital-labor ratio across each 2-digit industries is used to split the firms within the
industries into two group. ’Non-public firms’ mainly include private-owned firms and foreign-owned firms; ’Public firms’ refer to
state-owned firms and collective-owned firms. Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total
profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed Effects
are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. Instruments are the same as those in Table
3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***). See Table B7 for the
classification of each industry.
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Table 8: Rent sharing by ownership type
State-owned Collective-owned Private-owned Foreign-owned
Gross Profits 1.893 1.107 2.220 0.349
(1.300) (0.420)∗∗∗ (0.988)∗∗ (0.306)
Observations 71,682 128,279 549,703 232,530
Adjusted R2 0.749 0.610 0.535 0.661
F statistics 410.6 421.5 1,392 822.9
Elasticity 0.012 0.019 0.044 0.010
Lester Range (%) 38.89 22.35 53.84 19.39
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.148 0.080 0.079 0.443
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.062) (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.00005 0.0022 0.00009 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)
Total import (1st lag) 0.0000 -0.00003 0.00003 0.00002
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.722 0.567 0.502 0.664
F statistics 5.98 72.42 260.4 23.2
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 7.313 19.62 11.22 23.86
Hansen J p-value 0.796 0.185 0.446 0.086
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the wage bill’)
per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed Effects are fixed effects
for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. Instruments are the same as those in Table 3. Values
in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table 9: Rent sharing by female share
below median percentage Above median percentage
of female workers of female workers
Gross Profits 1.381 0.212
(0.331)∗∗∗ (0.994)
Observations 412,436 430,258
Adjusted R2 0.633 0.595
F statistics 885.8 1,255
Elasticity 0.039 0.003
Lester Range (%) 54.84 6.03
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.236 0.104
(0.025)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0002 0.00002
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)
Total import (1st lag) 0.00005 0.00001
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.652
F statistics 91.42 47.07
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.001
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 35.75 4.334
Hansen J p-value 0.716 0.011
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the
wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed
Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. Instruments are
the same as those in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05
(**); and 0.01 (***). Firms are grouped into two categories, according to the proportion of female employees
in each firm in 2004: firms with below and above the median percentage of female workers.
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Table 10: Rent sharing by skilled workers share
Below the median of the Above the median of the
ratio of skilled workers ratio of skilled workers
Gross Profits 1.099 1.374
(0.684) (0.347)∗∗∗
Observations 404,969 437,766
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.647
F statistics 1,055 1,019
Elasticity 0.020 0.034
Lester Range (%) 34.63 50.98
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.112 0.232
(0.030)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0002 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.00001
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.653 0.574
F statistics 73.16 70.05
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 6.229 34.37
Hansen J p-value 0.841 0.006
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the
wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed
Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. Instruments are
the same as those in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*);
0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***). Skilled workers are defined as workers with technical titles, including workers with
senior, middle and junior technical titles, plus senior technicians and other technicians. Firms are grouped
into two categories, according to the proportion of skilled workers in each firm in 2004: firms with below and
above the median percentage of skilled workers.
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Table 11: Rent sharing by changes in profits
Decrease in Unchanged Increase in
Gross Profit Gross Profits Gross Profits
Gross Profits 1.184 1.033 1.123
(0.635)∗ (1.987) (0.322)∗∗∗
Observations 530,760 228,404 638,749
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.708 0.627
F statistics 1,412 518.4 1,505
Elasticity 0.017 0.032 0.024
Lester Range (%) 36.16 36.32 39.96
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.115 0.062 0.266
(0.026)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00003 -0.0000 0.00002
× Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.873 0.586
F statistics 36.39 96.47 116.8
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.024 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 8.466 1.925 36.61
Hansen J p-value 0.750 0.755 0.727
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total
profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed
effects and firm controls. Crossed FEs are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit
industry and a province. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels:
0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***). Firms in the ’decrease in gross profits’ category are those
whose gross profits drop by 10% or more compared to the previous year; firms with unchanged
gross profits are those whose change rate of gross profits varies between -10% and +20%; the
remaining are firms with increase in gross profits of more than 20%. Instruments are the same
as those in Table 3 - column 4.
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Table 12: Rent sharing: the role of rural labour (Jiangsu
province)
(1) (2)
Gross Profits 2.735 2.385
(0.623)∗∗∗ (0.692)∗∗∗
Rural employees 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Gross profits -0.027 -0.025
× Rural employees (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Observations 141,919 141,919
Adjusted R2 0.625 0.631
F statistics 287.3 289.2
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes
Year FE Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes
Crossed FE Yes
Elasticity 0.028 0.023
Lester Range (%) 47.63 39.69
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.446
F statistics 25.01 14.79
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 5.545 7.169
Hansen J p-value 0.245 0.164
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm in the
Jiangsu province. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the wage bill’)
per worker per firm of Jiangsu province. ’Rural employees’ is the number
of employees employed in rural areas in each municipal district, county
and year. Crossed FEs are fixed effects for each combination of a year
and a two-digit industry. Instruments are the same as those in Table 3 -
column 4. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance
levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics: year 2004-2007
Variables Mean StDev
Firm characteristics (N=1,028,184
Wages per worker 16.359 15.832
Gross Profits per worker (after the wage bill) 0.0217 0.0937
Gross Profits per worker (before the wage bill) 0.0386 0.0976
Net Profits per worker 0.0184 0.0869
Value Added per worker 0.1254 0.3099
Firm size 228.63 847.80
Firm age 9.0667 9.0928
Capital per worker 85.652 214.741
Foreign-owned firms 0.2192 0.4137
Minimum Wages/Wages per worker 0.5165 0.9109
Weighted analysis (number of workers per firms)
Wages per worker 18.623 17.862
Gross Profits per worker (after the wage bill) 0.0234 0.0810
Gross Profits per worker (before the wage bill) 0.0426 0.0890
Net Profits per worker 0.0195 0.0706
Value Added per worker 0.1196 0.2986
Minimum Wages/Wages per worker 0.4745 0.9796
County characteristics (N=10,898)
Minimum Wages 5.1168 1.2155
Average Wages per worker 14.2858 7.7215
Minimum Wages/Average Wages per worker 0.4130 0.1553
Average Gross Profits per worker 0.0189 0.0356
Number of workers 21,571 64,009
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database. The
definitions and units of variables that reflect firm characteristics are the same as in
Table 1. The monetary variables ’Minimum Wages, County’ and ’Average wages per
worker, County’ are in thousands of Yuan(RMB). The monetary variable ’Average
Profits per worker, County’ is in millions of Yuan(RMB). ’Number of workers’ is the
number of total workers in each district or county.
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Table 14: Rent sharing: the role of minimum wages
log minimum wages log average wages per worker
(county) (county)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Averaged Profits 0.146 1.637 1.629 3.499
(0.051)∗∗∗ (0.197)∗∗∗ (0.197)∗∗∗ (0.560)∗∗∗
Minimum wages 0.018 0.025
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
Average Profits -0.352
×Minimum wages (0.103)∗∗∗
Observations 10,859 10,859 10,859 10,859
Adjusted R2 0.873 0.741 0.742 0.742
F statistics 2,092,590 738,475 493,047 370,561
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elasticity 0.003 0.031 0.031 0.032
Lester Range (%) 2.08 23.29 23.17 24.18
Notes: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**);
and 0.01 (***).
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Table 15: Rent sharing: the role of labour market concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gross Profits 1.663 1.186 1.462 1.217 1.551 1.556
(0.175)∗∗∗ (0.313)∗∗∗ (0.177)∗∗∗ (0.312)∗∗∗ (0.177)∗∗∗ (0.174)∗∗∗
SFEMP -0.401 -0.289 -1.213 -0.865
(0.039)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗∗ (0.086)∗∗∗ (0.087)∗∗∗
Gross Profits 3.426 2.985 20.433 14.275
× SFEMP (0.935)∗∗∗ (0.882)∗∗∗ (3.110)∗∗∗ (3.096)∗∗∗
SFEMP2 1.158 0.803
(0.099)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗
Gross Profits -24.695 -16.092
× SFEMP2 (3.977)∗∗∗ (3.884)∗∗∗
HHI -0.271 -0.277
(0.029)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗
Gross Profits 5.017 4.587
×HHI (1.234)∗∗∗ (1.206)∗∗∗
Observations 1,010,725 1,010,411 1,010,725 1,010,411 1,010,725 1,009,789
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.633 0.619 0.632 0.616 0.620
F statistics 1,679 1,794 1,337 1,395 1,698 1,686
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FEs Yes Yes Yes
Elasticity 0.035 0.025 0.037 0.035
Lester Range (%) 57.46 41.16 58.13 57.83
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.600 0.594 0.600 0.594 0.595
F statistics 146.4 98.13 129.1 80.87 169.3 161.5
K-P rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P rk Wald F-stat 79.04 21.49 51.41 14.84 80.49 78.85
Hansen J p-value 0.121 0.180 0.253 0.202 0.070 0.069
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the
wage bill’) per worker per firm. ’SFEMP’ is the proportion of the firm’s employment in total employment in each
municipal district and county per year. ’SFEMP2’ is the square of ’SFEMP’. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for
each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. ’HHI’ is calculated at the district or county level
as the sum of SFEMP2 in the district(county)-year level. Crossed FEs in columns 2 and 4 are fixed effects for each
combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province; while crossed effects in column 6 are the fixed effects
for each combination of a province and a two-digit industry. Instruments are the same as those in Table 3 - column
4. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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A Appendix: Robustness: alternative measures of rents (net
wages; gross profits before the wage bill; value added)
Table A1: Rent sharing, net profits, OLS models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Profits 0.734 0.542 0.229 0.199 0.452
(0.167)∗∗∗ (0.124)∗∗∗ (0.063)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗∗
Firm size -0.009 -0.143 -0.148 -0.163
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Capital per worker 0.071 0.063 0.063 0.078
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Foreign 0.357 0.045 0.050 0.019
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Constant 2.451 2.163 2.914 2.934 3.301
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,604,000 1,604,000 1,490,236 1,489,980 1,489,980
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.211 0.601 0.612 0.715
F statistic 13,290,899 4,873,024 9,172,816 9,432,074 1,828,262
Elasticity 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.007
Lester Range (%) 26.61 19.63 8.17 7.12 11.52
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Net profits’ is profits per worker
per firm after subtracting profits taxes. The control variables ’Firm size’ and ’Capital per worker’
are in logs. In column 5, we use the number of workers in each firm-year as weights (the remaining
regressions are un-weighted). Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-
digit industry and a province. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels:
0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table A2: Rent sharing, net profits, IV models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Profits 1.260 1.767 2.936 1.519
(0.370)∗∗∗ (0.725)∗∗ (1.665)∗ (0.360)∗∗∗
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,489,967 1,489,980 1,010,419 1,010,411
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.587 0.594 0.629
F statistics 3,710 3,486 2,073 2,450
Elasticity 0.020 0.028 0.051 0.026
Lester Range (%) 44.98 63.1 90.39 46.76
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.183 .188
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.019)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.00002
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.467 0.586 0.587
F statistics 204 184.4 161.2 128.8
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 129.6 11.65 2.936 38.5
Hansen J p-value 0.384
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Net profits’ is the total
profits per worker per firm after subtracting profits taxes. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each
combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instrument ’Average profits per
worker’ is the average net profits per worker of firms in the same four-digit industry and in the same
year but in other cities (of the same province and of other provinces). The other instruments are
the same as those in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels:
0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01(***). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value in column 3 is 0.096.
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Table A3: Rent sharing, gross profits before the wage bill, OLS models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross Profits 0.885 0.743 0.419 0.403 0.467
(0.302)∗∗∗ (0.252)∗∗∗ (0.189)∗∗ (0.180)∗∗ (0.266)∗
Firm size -0.008 -0.141 -0.146 -0.162
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Capital per worker 0.068 0.062 0.061 0.077
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Foreign 0.350 0.044 0.050 0.019
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Constant 2.432 2.155 2.897 2.917 3.285
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.030)∗∗∗
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,604,000 1,604,000 1,490,236 1,489,980 1,489,980
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.226 0.606 0.616 0.718
F statistic 13,754,769 5,014,767 9,316,764 9,574,622 1,868,006
Elasticity 0.030 0.025 0.014 0.014 0.017
Lester Range (%) 45.1 37.86 21.14 20.34 20.34
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits
(’before the wage bill’) per worker per firm. In column 5, we use the number of workers in each
firm-year as weights (the remaining regressions are un-weighted). Crossed Effects are fixed effects for
each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. Values in parentheses are robust
standard errors. Significant levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table A4: Rent sharing, value added, OLS models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value Added 0.312 0.233 0.121 0.111
(0.052)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗
Firm size -0.005 -0.138 -0.143
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
Capital per worker 0.066 0.061 0.061
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗
Foreign 0.355 0.044 0.050
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Constant 2.428 2.147 2.884 2.906
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Observations 1,604,000 1,604,000 1,490,236 1,489,980
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.215 0.602 0.613
F statistics 13,478,849 4,913,196 9,202,375 9,458,972
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes
Elasticity 0.034 0.025 0.013 0.012
Lester Range (%) 35.95 26.82 14.06 12.89
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Value added’ is
the value added per worker per firm. The control variables ’Firm size’ and ’Capital per
worker’ are in logs. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a
two-digit industry and a province. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.
Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 (***).
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Table A5: Rent sharing, value added, IV models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value Added 0.357 0.979 0.431 0.524
(0.164)∗∗ (0.571)∗ (0.232)∗ (0.188)∗∗∗
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crossed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,489,967 1,489,980 1,010,419 1,010,411
Adjusted R2 0.607 0.534 0.628 0.621
F statistics 3,798 2,660 2,324 2,189
Elasticity 0.039 0.107 0.050 0.061
Lester Range (%) 41.56 113.9 49.21 59.74
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average sales per worker 0.033 0.028
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0002 0.0001
(0.000)∗ (0.000)
Total import (1st lag) 0.0001 0.0001
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.485 0.485 0.520 0.520
F statistics 720.7 715.2 405.3 290.1
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.030 0.003 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 34.88 3.369 3.695 4.793
Hansen J p-value 0.438
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Value added’ is the value
added per worker per firm. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a
two-digit industry and a province. The instrument ’Average sales per worker’ is the average sales
per worker of firms in the same four-digit industry and in the same year but in other cities (of
the same province and of other provinces). The other instruments are the same as those in Table
3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and
0.01(***). The Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value in column 3 is 0.096.
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B Appendix: Additional descriptives and robustness checks
Table B1: Number of firms and workers per year
Year
All firms Importing firms
Firms Workers
Workers
per firm
Firms Workers
Workers
per firm
2000 125,798 41,662,192 331 13,434 7,774,624 579
2001 136,796 41,524,315 304 15,707 8,729,683 556
2002 146,382 42,384,259 290 17,174 9,585,423 558
2003 166,840 46,322,681 278 19,473 10,720,960 551
2004 228,455 51,376,357 225 28,188 13,731,899 487
2005 236,189 56,574,219 240 28,122 14,736,443 524
2006 264,337 60,928,943 230 28,609 14,925,172 522
2007 299,203 66,195,942 221 45,407 20,210,991 445
Annual 218,937 53,532,008 245 28,387 14,079,353 496
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese Industry Enterprises Database.
Table B2: Distribution of firms per years
in the data
Year All firms Importing firms
1 year 113,764 29,687
2 year 77,610 11,852
3 year 61,666 8,690
4 year 82,590 7,930
5 year 32,958 4,004
6 year 25,143 3,311
7 year 27,094 3,049
8 year 39,294 2,963
Notes: Own calculations based on the Chinese
Industry Enterprises Database. Numbers of
firms (all firms, firms that import) that are
present in the data in each number of years.
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Table B3: Rent sharing by firm size
Small-size Firms Large-size Firms
Gross Profits 0.077 1.013
(0.126) (0.335)∗∗∗
Observations 422,864 545,166
Adjusted R2 0.622 0.676
F statistics 841.3 1,150
Elasticity 0.002 0.017
Lester Range (%) 3.19 26.76
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.117 0.241
(0.036)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0002 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.0058 0.0000
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.593
F statistics 71.87 106.4
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 7.958 54.51
Hansen J p-value 0.193 0.087
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the
total profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and
crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each combination
of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instruments are the same as those
in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*);
0.05 (**); and 0.01(***).
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Table B4: Rent sharing by firm age
New Firms Old Firms
Gross Profits 1.264 1.372
(0.626)∗∗ (0.454)∗∗∗
Observations 435,578 526,859
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.672
F statistics 1,006 1,322
Elasticity 0.029 0.026
Lester Range (%) 46.23 43.34
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.153 0.187
(0.028)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0002 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00005 0.00001
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000)∗ (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.661 0.577
F statistics 105.5 65.72
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 12.18 23.87
Hansen J p-value 0.934 0.043
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross
profits’ is the total profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All
specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed
Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry
and a province. The instruments are the same as those in Table 3. Values
in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05
(**); and 0.01(***).
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Table B5: Rent sharing by firms regions
Eastern Central Western
Area Area Area
Gross Profits 1.033 3.983 1.733
(0.345)∗∗∗ (1.961)∗∗ (0.608)∗∗∗
Observations 763,397 152,501 94,504
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.526 0.625
F statistics 1,919 319.4 276.1
Elasticity 0.023 0.076 0.022
Lester Range (%) 36.32 128.1 39.49
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.206 0.094 0.237
(0.023)∗∗∗ (0.028)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0001 0.00009 0.0007
(0.000)∗ (0.000) (0.000)∗∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00002 0.0001 0.00009
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)∗
Adjusted R2 0.593 0.657 0.570
F statistics 101.9 96.01 17.03
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 30.56 5.137 13.72
Hansen J p-value 0.331 0.356 0.312
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is
the total profits (’after the wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include
firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed Effects are fixed effects for each
combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instruments are
the same as those in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors.
Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01(***). Anderson-Rubin Wald test
p-value in column 2 is 0.001.
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Table B6: Rent sharing: IV results by schooling
Below the median of the Above the median of the
average years of schooling average years of schooling
Gross Profits 0.931 1.344
(0.613) (0.345)∗∗∗
Observations 421,590 421,169
Adjusted. R2 0.548 0.647
F statistics 953.7 1,109
Elasticity 0.014 0.038
Lester Range (%) 15.76 61.42
Auxiliary Regression (First-stage)
Average profits per worker 0.095 0.236
(0.024)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗
Subsidy 0.0003 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗
Total import (1st lag) 0.00003 0.00002
×Exchange rate dollar/yuan (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.608
F statistics 109.3 65.94
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 6.438 31.29
Hansen J p-value 0.001 0.722
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker per firm. ’Gross profits’ is the total profits (’after the
wage bill’) per worker per firm. All specifications include firm and crossed effects and firm controls. Crossed
Effects are fixed effects for each combination of a year, a two-digit industry and a province. The instruments are
the same as those in Table 3. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. Significance levels: 0.1 (*); 0.05
(**); and 0.01 (***). Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value in column 1 is 0.080. We consider the proportion of
employees with different academic qualifications in each firm in 2004 to calculate the average years of schooling
of employees in each firms, and then we compute the median average years of schooling across all firms, again in
2004. Firms are then grouped into two categories: firms with below the median of average years of schooling and
firms with above the median of average years of schooling. Years of schooling for different academic qualifications:
Junior high school and below, 7.5; High school, 12; College, 15; University, 16; Graduate, 19.
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Table B7: Chinese Industry Classification
Labour-intensive Industry Capital-intensive Industry
code name code name
17 Manufacture of Textile 13 Processing of Food from Agricultural Products
18 Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and
Caps
14 Manufacture of Foods
19 Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 15 Manufacture of Beverages
20 Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rat-
tan, Palm, and Straw Products
16 Manufacture of Tobacco
21 Manufacture of Furniture 22 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products
24 Manufacture of Articles for Culture, Education and Sport
Activity
23 Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media
29 Manufacture of Rubber 25 Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nu-
clear Fuel
34 Manufacture of Metal Products 26 Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemi-
cal Products
35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 27 Manufacture of Medicines
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 28 Manufacture of Chemical Fibers
39 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 30 Manufacture of Plastics
40 Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and
Other Electronic Equipment
31 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products
41 Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for
Cultural Activity and Office Work
32 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals
42 Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing 33 Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals
43 Recycling and Disposal of Waste 36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery
Notes: According to the median capital-labour ratio of enterprises in each 2-digit industry, the industries are sorted into labor-intensive industries and capital-
intensive industries. Specifically, following Lu, 2010,Dai et al., 2014, we take the median capital-labor ratio of all enterprises in each 2-digit industry as the
capital-labor ratio of the industry, and then take the median capital-labour ratio of industries as the dividing point, the industries are sorted into labor-intensive
and capital-intensive industries. The median capital-labour ratio of industry is 39.04 thousands Yuan/perosn.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the share of each firm’s employment in its local labour market in
2004
Figure 4: Distribution of the share of each firm’s sales in its four-digit industry in 2004
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Figure 5: Herfindahl index (local labour market employment shares) in 2004
Figure 6: Herfindahl index (four-digit industry sales share) in 2004
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Figure 7: Firm’s labour market employment and four-digit industry sales in 2004
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